Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 045b697da5bb8403…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB Created: 2021-09-17 15:10:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: f2cf2d1205af5a805cf01912de9c5a30 SHA-1: e81d130bad3daa623fa410589fe69242fcb8b838 SHA-256: 045b697da5bb8403a2d03c5ff90861d32eaba76294cc1843a35637f60116c6b9
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF containing embedded JavaScript, which is a common technique for delivering malicious content. Several heuristics indicate the presence of links to potentially compromised or disposable hosting, suggesting an attempt to distribute further payloads or conduct phishing. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly support its malicious nature, likely serving as a lure to download a second-stage exploit or malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9975

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://diarch.in/WYSIWYGImage/file/10696723679.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://krindustria.com.br/site/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16132401616ed0---lerezawilupusimuzatepedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://scenekunstskolen-efteruddannelsen.dk/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lazamirowebasoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hungryalex.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/59bcdde3bab5e15845224dd35b8ee547/kixexabekizuvorajis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xszhuhai.com/uploadfiles/files/26586321722.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiomedicoveterinariobellucci.eu/userfiles/files/31126109718.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cartopack.be/Images/file/49714779153.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sesc.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4bds5dfr62gl48no853kufq705/mewed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://amdind.com/userfiles/file/8703626099.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nassagroup.org/app/webroot/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fifijufolawikiti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://afanasyev-design.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9ad7d6990b0e7e85db6c6919cc63dee9/vokiwusal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mini-garden.ru/userfiles/file/30617999153.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://paloaltospeakerseries.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0423f81c8e7e7b4efe2b4a2cf300d47e/todusiporavaselixax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dalilak1.com/userfiles/file/50284354474.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://appinaris.net/ckfinder/userfiles/publics/files/sejelozexoxodi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://33mobility.net/uploads/files/fonerabe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ddc-touggourt.dz/ar/files/wazemexitot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://grandiosieventinuziali.it/filesUploads/file/zujifujogiruxiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--b1amishc2fb.xn--p1ai/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kifubixuduxubawumiditunu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://protectname.xyz/whoisprivacy/userfiles/files/9250917040.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arendic.cl/files/76531717253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bestforfishing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e8cbf108fd9a309102a074e6d22fddc8/47281332416.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cn-polylysine.com/d/files/47019644004.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nikkenj.com/userfiles/file/mefotisan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=favor+kirk+franklin+lyricsPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d282.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD282 17244 bytes
SHA-256: ef4a6ff5a93057dedb2221371590011c51db3d1c3e20409d476f246459179b26
font_01_sfnt_off0000ff27.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFF27 10348 bytes
SHA-256: 1651a8c53aee58763669cc52729581fc0d4a4bc416428109884a4ffd6bb88e63
font_02_sfnt_off0001169f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1169F 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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