Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 041f7a76784bce3d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.8 KB Created: 2020-10-05 21:42:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: d79adfa89a0b8ea90e3078902fffbcff SHA-1: e2d8693b1e39dc1b809e0ec7d01e9dc7efd2cda7 SHA-256: 041f7a76784bce3d4bd433e87ad765e77575cffa93b3720f4ddb80c128a2fe4f
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with one specifically identified as a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, also contains URLs pointing to link farms hosted on disposable domains. This suggests the primary function is to redirect users to malicious sites, potentially for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=basic+security+testing+with+kali+lin In PDF document text
    • https://site-1036977.mozfiles.com/files/1036977/61503418283.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036818.mozfiles.com/files/1036818/nalozadezusawaroxawuwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037187.mozfiles.com/files/1037187/34477178643.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nowixam.aircraftmodelling.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969060/midiwazebagefup-lunifor-didowuxevosele.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.cassatastreats.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379732/sosimaduvamofa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.katwalla.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969761/6857837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tesot.pome.ca/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682646/6d234f0acd429e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lrconcretetechnology.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070045/xavulogutotilebozomo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037029.mozfiles.com/files/1037029/zilirinazudizejubet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036724.mozfiles.com/files/1036724/53447664233.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038949.mozfiles.com/files/1038949/46498248897.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036667.mozfiles.com/files/1036667/67456528320.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1041611.mozfiles.com/files/1041611/pezidisifamuli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1042834.mozfiles.com/files/1042834/66657729637.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040800.mozfiles.com/files/1040800/toreni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005446.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5446 5140 bytes
SHA-256: 037327d5c16a2b26a030e5197ad94ce207938b2352c52f83942c23ea47eb1c84
font_01_sfnt_off000065c7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x65C7 9900 bytes
SHA-256: dbd247e066be1f25d6d25daa8a6f175bef41d89c5528fa04404904d8f70d7c30
font_02_sfnt_off0000879e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x879E 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176

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