Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 041af2d16a51d238…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.9 KB Created: 2021-02-19 14:07:32 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: ef0b79ab5590b84d86ae6c3c1bf9de92 SHA-1: 236e26ff9bf2d58865152fb4cd6be84d85c30cb2 SHA-256: 041af2d16a51d23850e0072b76f4d207a71c51f1eb50478f1c5313a3f67bd3a0
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded URLs pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure and disposable hosting, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of malicious intent, likely to redirect users to a compromised site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wix?keyword=que+idioma+se+habla+en+egipto+antiguo In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pabopimi/ddifjjV/antibiotics_choices_for_common_infections.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://storefromit.pro/urie_bronfenbrenner_biography3xgs1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://morpeoplelife.ru/fugulixizuwalejaburimijeg69x54.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://form-lnstagramverifiedbadges.com/timberjack_240_service_manual2oxvv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rizakumer/iiuZiaG/roleti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sayfelengs.space/diamond_aircraft_parts_manual4uq7l.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://getyourscore.info/arcane_quest_legends_freek20ar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lekemevegov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131410090/717b542d1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nugekurobeju.iblogger.org/free_character_counts_worksheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zumaboletafu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454272/7180628.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vixuwegijelo/vgeC2Z0/jizutakakopetalakojuxix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://varepanuror.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135394497/4a3ab3c04.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wilowukodol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134881933/gobosalilami.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zafatuxowusetex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739053/muvifil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vipujitebiki/jdYC04X/weriwekejolemax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jimikafede/hETgiii/mekedaxono.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://wizuzipureja.epizy.com/16908638159.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tametawoga.rf.gd/vetulipekomeseponiwavuped.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xalenefinuj.rf.gd/mole_ratio_lab_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xavisijividefo.epizy.com/65539222604.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000feff.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFEFF 5360 bytes
SHA-256: fed4f6f363068af95d6345d6fe606ee96406834c4cb0d11455cff0cbe63e113e
font_01_sfnt_off0001110b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1110B 11528 bytes
SHA-256: 0cfa6bf31642cf57743d335227d7f453459a81836c354ab29c85c277d3065eb4
font_02_sfnt_off00013670.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13670 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

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