Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 040264e990bfdbac…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.7 KB Created: 2021-09-16 08:36:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: d7a1cc8da9727991f5b5c6c474d85d84 SHA-1: d8d658bfb5f3f5c4fa5d1c4671695ae190773449 SHA-256: 040264e990bfdbac660094565bb93a3e3b4210949fdcf36c751e7d7e23b2ed72
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It exhibits social engineering tactics, specifically a 'ClickFix' lure, instructing the user to copy and paste commands into a terminal. This is a common method to bypass macro restrictions and execute a secondary payload, likely downloaded from one of the numerous embedded URLs. The file also contains malformed stream data, indicating potential exploit activity.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9981

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://9ja-bet.com/userfiles/file/95462783391.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://salukool.ee/upload/userfiles/file/44000600943.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thomasgearon.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/69500064278.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vidaleve.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/83101473739.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://barcelona-health.com/files/galeria/files/jabovuwefome.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baconbites.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f39n8utbc0rf7p39jd05pvfl32/6056192566.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://buka.ru/sadm_files/8255641161.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bloomlight.pl/_bloom/file/59508249218.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://egokituz.eus/files/galeria/files/lolagepixepizefumef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://raczpalinka.hu/userfiles/file/resosoro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.chortho.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jaf4od0lp092kidvcn6deqev7c/58809114355.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kingswaytyres.com/project/kingsway/uploads/file/torutuvibuxawo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://premo.at/userfiles/file/82009854341.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alwaysflorida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161422c69a8e4e---wosefonofokusisusokisege.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rosenstein.lu/userfiles/files/85099656691.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mastrodibaglio.it/userfiles/files/bexafapumek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://english-island.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l5ecqeqicgpiiqusj5vvniu6q2/xabudogaxixupidowutilaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://riccaassociati.eu/userfiles/files/93728009221.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://happyland-nsk.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kogawinegepezifesasog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://adsbudget.net/userfiles/file/55358284250.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bongoes62.dk/userfiles/file/zuvinenojemajid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://haphadoor.com/upload/files/2543625820.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=clear+dns+androidPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d4cd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD4CD 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000ecdf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECDF 17580 bytes
SHA-256: a99fe61c79466158d3cb3976c93fc1b93230a69357953b929c022cdb7b076e5c
font_02_sfnt_off00011a95.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11A95 10176 bytes
SHA-256: a4b653823175cf3b3d9cf18b4d6e452ed2c086533f6c33ee9cd843fd06866673

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