Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0400921adeb2d057…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.18 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 916e52a8485f9d83e9d6cb76ebc087fd SHA-1: d0c031491fe39f6cee3102a01579321fb1093f05 SHA-256: 0400921adeb2d057a7a912572c7aa1c917eb6924557ae906f7ea1ef46737c7c8
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199, which is used to download and execute a remote loader from the URL 'https://techuntangler.tools/sOp9N4'. The presence of VBA macros, although not containing executable statements directly, suggests a potential vector for further execution or obfuscation. The embedded PDF also shows suspicious static findings, indicating a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://techuntangler.tools/sOp9N4
    • http://evertype.comhttp://tulrich.comCopyright
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLRupakaraRegularRupakara

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off000010ab.bin
41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB 88240 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00096e00.pdf
fcae289c40f59a4f2664d220e4d3ae26fedf39f3bd730b568c601fe8b2e1e55b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x96E00 617984 bytes

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