Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 03f47427e1434c3d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.2 KB Created: 2020-08-09 02:20:24 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 30b9140846b6fbec11f826a98d1c3221 SHA-1: e0bb02f243c3be0e45c759b8301a6cbb0e78e660 SHA-256: 03f47427e1434c3d38e7a7e5ec459537d6fe5db0531506f61988fcdaa4bba45e
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with one identified as a malicious redirector. The heuristic 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' suggests the document attempts to trick the user into executing commands, likely to download and run a payload. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the presence of numerous links points to a link farm or redirection strategy.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=beginning+with+code_aster+pdf
    • http://files.nycsigmakappa.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453499/fb96883ee0.pdf
    • http://files.sylverspoon.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856949/mamob_wuvamiroza_feluv.pdf
    • http://files.pontotoccarsales.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776167/6853925.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5276/9192/files/jiwosejusinagasi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3513/1046/files/84130420793.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6802/3194/files/6946703157.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7865/5903/files/same_meaning_words_in_english.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/9489/9864/files/10405458754.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/1698/5508/files/cctv_camera.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/nanejixiv.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8787/1646/files/mafotojumexebe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6126/5062/files/74844381920.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7785/1550/files/fundamentals_of_modern_manufacturing_5th_edition.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8093/1742/files/91912472408.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1764/9819/files/26463956132.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/7997/5591/files/renci_sshnet_example.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006548.bin
2e1a5988113afed1c193eaa02fce19f96dd06c92ef95b0afbb8025b6cf1d7e39		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6548 5556 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000784c.bin
e55bacdab28975c1265317a200790db36b057d1a944b2c1f6552c16684b34269		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x784C 10392 bytes

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