Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 03ada0f4188c94fd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.9 KB Created: 2020-08-30 00:23:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 59f3fe65b498dbe628abb37ef8904c28 SHA-1: 0f0702aa9c603e7262409bee967e16ad80715f70 SHA-256: 03ada0f4188c94fd0aa526c0f5b361b8a6454307577d97a6c8ca70b7b50c5d1b
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for linking to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though obfuscated, contains a URL that is also flagged as malicious. The presence of a remote-support tool lure suggests a pretext for further compromise or social engineering. No scripts were extracted, but the embedded malicious link is the primary indicator of compromise.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=%25D1%2581%25D0%25BA%25D0%25B0%25D1%2587%25D0%25B0%25D1%2582%25D1%258C+%25D1%2581%25D0%25BE%25D1%2585%25D1%2580%25D0%25B0%25D0%25BD%25D0%25B5%25D0%25BD%25D0%25B8%25D1%258F+%25D0%25BD%25D0%25B0+%25D0%25B8%25D0%25B3%25D1%2580%25D1%2583+my+summer
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3633/4501/files/gisewifuduzerob.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5107/3174/files/89200956269.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/7821/9944/files/28604104186.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9324/5590/files/actualizations_stewart_emery.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_4f2323e87bf54026b0bbdf474025b9ae.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/12745a_a992e41e6439423888297ba30d0914f7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/912de2_e599e93b7fd748e4bf52c54527b5449b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/79cb75_b6e73a2f1ef042caaba997eb5bddf4ef.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2756/9576/files/bedoxidejotaxavamo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/5353/7690/files/nolosipasipifedomumer.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/0635/9713/files/7433187113.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9592/4637/files/best_anydesk_alternative_for_android.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6523/5866/files/elementary_differential_equations_9th_edition.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1878/8774/files/books_on_apostolic_ministry.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5489/0149/files/tevumulowe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6065/8333/files/lilizafujuwobon.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/99744184538.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005dba.bin
042c449c8590d4eeba048aae416609cf9c3f221362b7152aaf1f72aab8e8d020		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5DBA 6144 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007184.bin
502c294739ab6aa0bdc6e977bb338a3b0f9dd60d51c0c2e06ab8337e43b422f2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7184 15420 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a172.bin
532315dfdc59b350d447ad91845dd8cc72a836e684f536ab9a4305dc5b53fb8e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA172 16204 bytes

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