Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0367554ce285a362…

MALICIOUS

RTF

780.2 KB First seen: 2020-12-25
MD5: a3b705ce3d677361a7a9b2b0bdf04a04 SHA-1: f3eb833f53dac1cc98b3b411c6d9fd66603cec02 SHA-256: 0367554ce285a3622eb5ca1991cfcb98b620d0609c07cf681d9546e2bf1761c4
422 Risk Score

Heuristics 10

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-7110189-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-7110189-0
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 6 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://sepacloud.eu/file/Documents/document_78219.jpg In RTF body
    • https://sepacloud.eu/file/Documents/document_78219.jpg\ul0\cf0}}}}\f0\fs22\parIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00018651.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x18651 1059 bytes
SHA-256: 0100e2dca3c68cd5fb34c6082a4ea42511b121985c7f7d7fadfed21b52d602eb
objdata_01_off00018eca.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x18ECA 339660 bytes
SHA-256: 0bc20f9f0dd45d237bd84435472954bac98054231051812fc3463605aa92be5e
objdata_02_off000beca0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBECA0 336 bytes
SHA-256: a3943c67aa3459bee72ce02f6cf2010ce1f38218ceb09de6a41c88506936264a
objdata_03_off000bef74.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBEF74 570 bytes
SHA-256: 9e551386ea439717b26b71f19dce2e70ccfad32449088429a1a0e86a3bd9a527
objdata_04_off000bf44f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF44F 2633 bytes
SHA-256: 7b8302b0c2db3ee011f9dd8467bed08b104a5998fb54ac1f164d0a75f2e24342
objdata_05_off000c0959.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC0959 4679 bytes
SHA-256: 1fee231696679796f1dc21edced3d7608d638c56e470178a34b4b6d7051d634d