Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0362a8d48df045c8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

267.0 KB Created: 2015-08-11 02:14:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2015-09-20
MD5: 4c16eaa472ae4c4706bac124b544c0d0 SHA-1: 9c139e0249c479a6bfd417e92209114bac1163b8 SHA-256: 0362a8d48df045c854fd199f9f8d43beda515b32d8b3b118462e53b855c411e0
90 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro, named 'Hameleon', appears to manipulate document content by deleting characters and changing font colors, potentially to hide malicious code or a lure. The presence of 'AutoOpen' and 'CreateObject' in the VBA p-code suggests an attempt to automatically execute code upon opening, indicative of a macro-based attack. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 5

  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    Goabc = Environ(sps)
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.iec.chIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1043 bytes
SHA-256: 1ea298f3c4a9d6e21273ff44541f555af2874ca6a909265afecba845e16d951a
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True


Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Hameleon()
Dim ij As Integer
Dim charCount As Integer
charCount = ActiveDocument.Characters.Count - 1
BHDW = "#"
JFQW = "$"
ij = 0
Do While True
    ij = ij + 1
    If (ActiveDocument.Characters(ij) = BHDW) Then
        If (ActiveDocument.Characters(ij - 1) = JFQW) Then
            ActiveDocument.Range(Start:=0, End:=ij).Delete
            ActiveDocument.Range(Start:=0, End:=charCount - ij - 1).Font.ColorIndex = wdBlack
            Exit Do
        End If
    End If
    If (ij = charCount) Then
        Exit Do
    End If
Loop
End Sub

Public Function Goabc(sps As String)
QJDQWS = "he2jk1 hj2g1hjgejh1g"
Goabc = Environ(sps)
End Function










Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.