IcedID — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0360a45e20212a1b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

34.2 KB Created: 2021-11-09 09:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: b865035c24594096b6a0099ad24c6892 SHA-1: afa0e4705556fffb7fd10c4cbcd59a5303d2bc95 SHA-256: 0360a45e20212a1bf5e96c702f08f5ec80d83baf562f544a5c0e14299c7b4186
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open subroutine that triggers the execution of a second-stage payload. The macro utilizes WScript.Shell to execute a command, likely downloading and running additional malware. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0' strongly suggests the IcedID family.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2568830be2731e420e25a1f88ba06837e7fdd7d976a82a7a4c38249e91103c46		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1014 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
b0e5373b8ea10ef98e83ca6d07940bba864a9849318e0f008b6f34df1e78fa74		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes

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