Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 035d59d40fed8d87…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

252.0 KB Created: 2022-09-15 08:40:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-09-15
MD5: 9e86589e0ca09e51fe6918fc04b5b1e4 SHA-1: ed4026d2fff7b2fb44a0bf12db88f1b0ff61eb78 SHA-256: 035d59d40fed8d87d58e85dc599fe341167da0ea7aa6bf07fad9e71ba98070e4
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. This suggests the document is designed to deliver and execute a secondary malicious component upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
8b13c1343b9c9f9d2ccfabfd83bf10ac328a304f4c1d288c4a267a06276a4277		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 168960 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
00e9bef2201e4807d5818990a239e2168d13ef2ffedebd1257b2db6a59f7d6dd		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 164478 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
b4f8d06f984869468f61dd8e920326181bc53f1f42d1f5172c47c0d0eca8b0b7		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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