Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 035105c47cfb4598…

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.3 KB First seen: 2023-02-22
MD5: 27d3a31561be5ee41e658decb47d6be5 SHA-1: e1b17648f11ada258faf2b313bbf73875aea63e2 SHA-256: 035105c47cfb45983c1cd58a51f6a9d29fdc868ac9b4150cdb1d2342e8a776de
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, likely for downloading and executing a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001906.bin
d44d8ff9d5db56c980d518a778d9b628f6db3c286044cca611ce82c3156ed1a7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1906 1304 bytes