Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 034c13ffc42f98a5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.2 KB Created: 2020-10-12 00:27:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 4641756574448a796488c3aadc5170e1 SHA-1: eb16d86a8a39209cad89a0395369f6a7f123d4d2 SHA-256: 034c13ffc42f98a5f77511e18c64cf0371f476c860fbf89a90a0007cd495d953
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links pointing to various domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially malicious content. The heuristic PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK specifically flags a URL that is known to be malicious. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=clash+of+clans+farming+attack+strategy+th10 In PDF document text
    • http://files.mtalphacycling.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437984/fimisiwopilagap_rebokojo_duxezomufotere.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rewoteti.caselabsupply.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683014/ef3204cf9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mopor.burgessoptical.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406343/fepefanebebomug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://titimif.womenagainsttaboo.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407588/natez_zekora.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.dbtfamilyskills.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740778/nujikaneduvogib_sibiwizokabun_jevofijetud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1041384.mozfiles.com/files/1041384/xijomezuxikonawubuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040042.mozfiles.com/files/1040042/66564130334.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1048574.mozfiles.com/files/1048574/xipafipifatelunodutexev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039911.mozfiles.com/files/1039911/guxanebara.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tuwiruta.proflightuas.us/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636655/355f9eee793.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mylenetessier.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455832/budexebojulo-pimudujoti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/1873/8600/files/67012579653.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7106/9594/files/14th_wedding_anniversary_flower.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0493/7537/9622/files/nexofeku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000691e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x691E 5560 bytes
SHA-256: 0d3bbefe076ba32abcf31bcd01876d29e368a20d83d9dde96ccb0f54e9bf0543
font_01_sfnt_off00007be8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7BE8 10480 bytes
SHA-256: dee05310b73f041e80b4f279231e1a446f8c112fc41d6b3af34ddf24d687852d

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