Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 033f09f0f8758934…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

32.8 KB Created: 2020-02-01 18:28:07 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000 First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: 87fa50b64797aa86556d1a6f732e7309 SHA-1: 6fb21037268729bf5b8a379321789b2592104147 SHA-256: 033f09f0f875893485319e3adcc75e820a7a58c54f52ac8763e6b0a5abd6dce2
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OOXML file containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor object. This object is known to be exploited to execute arbitrary code. The heuristic firings indicate the presence of shellcode and a suspicious URL, suggesting the file's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload. The URL http://b.link/quote_3321A89 was recovered from an embedded OLE object.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject3.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://b.link/quote_3321A89 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject3.bin 5936 bytes
SHA-256: a4f59656683ba59e88c59cd48669fdb10f2ffd049d16777678129a93c52a2cf0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd /c ren %tmp%\yy r.js&cscRiPT %tmp%\r.js  C
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject2.bin 10240 bytes
SHA-256: 3d9b6dd9df5b721ef25e244e24d639de43f683d4538f5dacb126ffb9ab91ec1d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.ScriptFullName, WScript = "WScript" '37487, WScript = sWScript + "."
ooxml_oleobject_01_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject2.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 7372 bytes
SHA-256: 684191856d28b0726ac73943903ed182a8104335784f8a8a706018bba887365e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.ScriptFullName, WScript = "WScript" '37487, WScript = sWScript + "."
ooxml_oleobject_02.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 3584 bytes
SHA-256: ff06519a449ffb2a854003ba7089f6ea7298490e54bb06b28c078254b834b32a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.Shell");
ooxml_oleobject_02_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 1018 bytes
SHA-256: 8bf0a73879a06ca9d5494b2c3dec679ce44235a425d2f9c290a1d3a10de933d0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.Shell");
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image1.emf 4968 bytes
SHA-256: 979dde2aed02f077c16ae53546c6df9eed40e8386d6db6fc36aee9f966d2cb82
emf_01.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image2.emf 1536 bytes
SHA-256: 4d4d1e7b04c99dcb8e885915068ad6f74cc2333e91580cdae5ccaa00c427247f