Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 032f649024cb936e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

219.5 KB Created: 2021-05-07 12:34:42 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 15.0300
MD5: 74965cfb33dc47a7d1a2757effcabd8f SHA-1: a05be246432b43fcfa1983630fc936f98cb9ee6f SHA-256: 032f649024cb936e4fc40b22c42400db2fa6fe0275cc585221674584287589f9
310 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an XLSM file containing a Workbook_Open macro that utilizes `CreateObject` to download a file from a remote URL using `ADODB.Stream` and then executes it via `rundll32.exe` and `Wscript.Shell`. This behavior is indicative of a downloader, likely attempting to fetch and run a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Downloader.TrendMicroDridex0521-9860965-0' further supports this assessment.

Heuristics 9

  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.TrendMicroDridex0521-9860965-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.TrendMicroDridex0521-9860965-0
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://plusify.in/wp-admin/css/colors/blue/LbMOrvuqScsDDYJ.php
    • https://ramdevagroindustries.com/images/blog/WZVRzcoUaXZ.php
    • https://lerc.gov.lr/231electricity/editor/tinymce/themes/modern/Z9grXigF03Qy.php
    • https://radiotupa.multsis.com.br/4uGJ27Vj5.php
    • https://buyjointsonline.com/wp-content/plugins/wpforms-lite/templates/emails/pM44c3eiAK6.php
    • https://ncc-services.com/ncc_hr/js/tinymce/plugins/advlist/Qw3HExfj.php
    • https://abgalecontractors.co.ke/wp-content/themes/twentynineteen/template-parts/content/eCcJg9X3R6V.php
    • https://repvoice.com/ltYn1z6L3M0Dr4.php
    • https://samakje.com/wp-content/plugins/siteorigin-panels/compat/js/70K882jFbZgmZF.php
    • https://plusify

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e957735c878fb34b4b9ff15d2c7c4b50919a9ede80cab2e575343bf231311872		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 40478 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
f7521055aad86e827d06fdf6a2ba939c7724a1738766710f6fbbe5aec8d1068a		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 249856 bytes

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