Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 032c20f2e70dc0d5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

42.5 KB
MD5: 298b57a5cc9634276e2c2fa77f58e3fe SHA-1: c82a9eb4cf9235a14f1c984302a9aa81594ea70b SHA-256: 032c20f2e70dc0d5900487d311cb98cff9c3187447a1c8aa730e59affa033ea4
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to CVE-2017-11882, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This vulnerability is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically for downloading and running further malicious stages. No document body or script content was available for further analysis.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001aa8.bin
4d96e274d24cfffd22f245fd71a244b9d949f203bee8cfb12109f148ed69769d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1AA8 1591 bytes