Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 032bfdbd2b276118…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.1 KB Created: 2020-09-02 19:00:01 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a675aedf0429b1caaa639e328d786cc3 SHA-1: 5a987e58a8a00073d5fe284ffa9fcad7249b6d58 SHA-256: 032bfdbd2b276118e3b92ae22c682b44efe6f08eebc328898519ab357746ad72
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link, which is also present in the document body. The document also exhibits a high-confidence ML classification for maliciousness and includes a lure to copy/paste content into a shell, suggesting an attempt to trick the user into executing commands. The presence of numerous PDF links, many pointing to benign content, suggests a link farm SEO tactic to obscure the malicious redirector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/wix?keyword=bearshare+free++for+windows+8
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.fontrix.comhttp://www.nhncorp.com
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a18aa6_5b659375ab5b4deeabc9c5464aedc250.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_5a19685ffd1140d99fbc63c84effa6a6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/91e123_90d6adbc8d8048a3a8c5f3805691e6ab.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/90423f_c67a20b7084c4d31892e0bb9166c8628.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/4595/1400/files/apple_pencil_apps.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/0669/5320/files/69055274676.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9682/6261/files/32498162190.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1455/3763/files/30461031812.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/dcc11b_7757154bad0643908fb877aeceaabec6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/bfbc46_fd6df23321ce486b9e9615adcf1e2d6c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/cb5dea_740fab0f2c2c4920b842892275b0e9c3.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005d26.bin
1e299bf0abce93d24def2d3fba0586870b64ed5821a338c65bcad4ad8830f587		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D26 5300 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006f3a.bin
2d9ccf9bd938f62f15c37a63fadea9143f9a534564bf6d0be48b0e8181530f93		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F3A 10360 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000092ae.bin
99dc99f891051cdbd138958a66ea6383a557cc7486c0c5acb0cb3ed99139840e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x92AE 2072 bytes

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