Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 03265b3f9c94dc5e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

367.1 KB Created: 2022-08-06 06:02:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-09
MD5: 9c2d87858a0d464154930b103c6e3fd3 SHA-1: 57028a775858eee61df005038846f6ca48e3f6a4 SHA-256: 03265b3f9c94dc5e6bcb827c70638b786ac3023f91a3669978552318af5ebca5
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. The 'OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE' heuristic indicates that this OLE package is designed to drop an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. This suggests the document is a dropper for a malicious executable.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
2af1ae7f7ec17a5b976500c0e0a691518e31ba5ea4a127d3a521e1f9f8f4e7d9		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 241152 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
e138288c96fd7bfe25e3a1f89ee999949ab7806a0ad08b1b0d48be8134cd194a		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 236103 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
2d819cfa4a0db7909cba164209788152bceb4dcae8a3b179c0ae37b278464aa1		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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