Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 030b9b0620aab745…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.7 KB Created: 2021-02-24 00:21:43 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: 9007d5b3a61746cb2c897ff2a43c5257 SHA-1: 42f9727195bc72ddc7b266329c9eb10e9b4725ba SHA-256: 030b9b0620aab745c7ebc30732b42bd455d57a41b48c7f049709a9742aeca334
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing operation. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous URLs suggest it's designed to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/strik?utm_term=how+to+do+business+taxes+canada PDF link annotation
    • https://xamikike.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406211/kujax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vakilonote.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382032/puverireximuwud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://niritopep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134634222/505938.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rapisakaxo.66ghz.com/bissell_cleanview_swivel_rewind_pet_upright_bagless_vacuum_cleaner_reviews.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fewoxenovof/gelqgiS/52249803926.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pikezusepi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740337/zapufiji-wukerezarutuli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sojanonef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969598/1844c4615c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wokulenazaxur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134744474/2186031.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sufudavinor.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381021/rozewetazar-jixekoru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dupomixu.iblogger.org/motorola_android_one_vs_poco_f1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://popogupu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398113/xapamevebute-varovovomasawi-muvemupav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mafobosapufi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134505980/pukosemopetulo-fejepig-gokotakub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://dizavinizekabos.rf.gd/77643630858.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vulewibof.epizy.com/51241816540.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://memapekoge.epizy.com/principal_business_activity_code_for_mgt_9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bejutamukedus.epizy.com/nuvaga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://totajenu.epizy.com/3540627749.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f2e7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF2E7 5064 bytes
SHA-256: ccab806bcfd9f55ad3c986a6fa0ad21bf0f02bf89ea00e10104d4438b751c4b5
font_01_sfnt_off00010448.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10448 10848 bytes
SHA-256: e245e2e0c4be3c29a133b73d2da2aae421347df986ec9ae7c296371afb9f6259