Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 030a702e9fe4035d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

467.3 KB Created: 2025-11-07 08:02:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000
MD5: 1347c3dfb9143e4111731e2d9685600a SHA-1: 85ade9d3a2441c22a02b2d8b9a4b0e94a57f8d67 SHA-256: 030a702e9fe4035d995361982023f35eb7c8bc13436997c708960702063e8aad
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file exhibits characteristics of a malicious document, specifically the OOXML_REMOTE_TEMPLATE and OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL heuristics, which indicate an attempt to load external content from the URL https://s.tunpok.com/7Sxq7. This suggests the document is designed to act as a lure, likely for spearphishing, to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of an embedded OLE object further supports the malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Remote template injection high OOXML_REMOTE_TEMPLATE
    Document references a remote template URL (https://s.tunpok.com/7Sxq7) — a common remote-template-injection vector used by Hancitor, Emotet and many phishing campaigns. Word can fetch and apply the remote template; macros in that template may execute depending on Office policy and trust state.
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: https://s.tunpok.com/7Sxq7
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://s.tunpok.com/7Sxq7
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
b30229f01639ff76a18bc111c064ebae8304c7c6652e06f469e77dfb186409fe
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Worksheet1.xlsx 193899 bytes
emf_00.emf
b4c1931c76311b7c3e1de92d6f6f8078c57c28814a1bf14de84994f4c9c22c4e
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 1227480 bytes