Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02f800e5fccbe66d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

184.7 KB Created: 2019-12-13 20:15:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: c1420c1c2cef7c07eaf5f2957f369a6d SHA-1: 76b16fdae4b85ab5a5026fefeb92b35ef8f2c2dc SHA-256: 02f800e5fccbe66d6563a9c6ff9c5246849a724263676a653e91e98de3c48e0e
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER' indicates a hidden command stager within a UserForm, and the 'Document_Open' macro is present, suggesting automatic execution upon opening. This pattern is typical of malware designed to download and execute further stages.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-7454029-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-7454029-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8b140e455a34f8aa92109811060058b938672f863f8a9ca7d458fa6e659b1eb2
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10966 bytes