Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02f5efc6a0b4da8f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.8 KB Created: 2021-02-18 14:44:22 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-07-07
MD5: 7667dcc4dfde7519b174606748305b07 SHA-1: a67490c42b527f48f499306d2fd035a20a15d94b SHA-256: 02f5efc6a0b4da8f67b20c3703dda27c78b8e14e7e7e4a1ae550c184d7039581
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs pointing to disposable hosting and known malicious redirectors, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of a spearphishing attachment designed to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wix?keyword=compass+worksheets+grade+4 In PDF document text
    • https://kebusivurokolu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135317059/7272661.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/liregevo/ijftidn/dejumakujusomejap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sifasawiseziwi.iblogger.org/5783690487.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gejupajo/hicgijh/tufurodosowaloniwiwenizo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://erogan-columbia.site/zigenexewazukirupurahv3v2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mepapogivoma/Igiuogc/63423813468.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zoxujaratufopa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135399722/fb7d4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baxelawinojiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134333718/d589753.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mibemofega/Yheyhbo/pubogomufugijiboxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ctyr.ru/genetic_engineering_definitionztn1d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://useporte.xyz/verathon_bladderscan_prime_plus_service_manualhyti9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://heartcenteredequestrian.com/the_panopticon_read_theory_answers8m64p.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://napuximijagebi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134766840/julutinomadodut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/voxipanovigepiv/animoto_pro_apk_mod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/purawuma/72853070832.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fedufiporara/vukeduxagenebakelotepi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cd01.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCD01 5492 bytes
SHA-256: 103a18ff63d26317b6a355fe35eb4f7f6d96b2d5180053c0766dca6141e5e214
font_01_sfnt_off0000df95.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF95 10048 bytes
SHA-256: 0e820047f959f605ad48266305b0bef367adbb11784f6f41112aa5598ef10868

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