Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02f3080da9ea1834…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.9 KB Created: 2009-07-28 12:46:19 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 9.0 Word 版 (via Adobe PDF Library 9.0)
MD5: b334189393cc5345c62a000364c02213 SHA-1: a4bf948e17b78eabc4503de97b74eba70658eb8b SHA-256: 02f3080da9ea18344d39dd9868c9ae181f2158789daf192c6e77be0cbaaaa13a
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded Flash content that exploits the CVE-2010-1297 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of the embedded SWF file and the specific CVE firing strongly indicate this attack vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.8120

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Flash authplay SWF exploit in PDF — CVE-2010-1297 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1297_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation, a crafted SWF with ActionScript prototype/AVM-era markers or the AES-PHP/authplay variant markers, and PDF-side shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static delivery shape associated with CVE-2010-1297 in Adobe Reader's bundled authplay.dll.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
    • HTTP://ADOBE.COM/AS3/2006/builtin

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
heapspray.swf
49a14590d7c5343695b133ff9651c2690c342ef5ac2bf002f18cd4348985f223		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 3 at offset 0x13750 8038 bytes
icc_00_off000103ad.icc
653b586c4707574ffcd648ba35494daed2c76ceafcf4c07d315ed961b1dc347f		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x103AD 408 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off000104da.bin
5bae21d6090f59a30136388865be4af1db24de6e621999b893f7c87caa7c43c4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x104DA 26096 bytes

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