Win.Trojan.Influenza-2 — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02f13b45b1c7b6ca…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

26.0 KB Created: 1993-09-28 16:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 01268f29b9504d21f989360db7145c4a SHA-1: fabea5189566aa0d5207b8ea8a4eb6a1edca2eef SHA-256: 02f13b45b1c7b6ca003efaee1cff6ef3189929895f0435bd68153eb15404bbd3
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Trojan.Influenza-2 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample exhibits characteristics of a legacy WordBasic macro virus, specifically the 'ToolsMacro' marker. Critical heuristics indicate an embedded Office document with suspicious static findings, including OLE slack anomalies and unreadable streams, suggesting deliberate obfuscation. ClamAV identifies the sample as Win.Trojan.Influenza-2, a known malware family.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Influenza-2 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Influenza-2
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 19,934 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 19,934 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00001a22.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x1A22 19934 bytes
SHA-256: bfc41454d16c201846768becbf8e36ab0b4de32fc3c33427c378afa1f4538bc3

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