Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02e83246c280e027…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.7 KB Created: 2021-02-17 11:00:50 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 4a34c97f9f731975ea362f2ec9e48fa3 SHA-1: 50d9ac708afc3dc42394cffd074a4cb5ee2a2e98 SHA-256: 02e83246c280e027931ad751676633a1dbe1b61742627e292f1c75b68c21694c
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous external URIs, many of which point to disposable domains and are likely part of a link farm designed to redirect users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, specifically phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URI patterns are consistent with techniques used to deliver second-stage payloads or redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/aws?utm_term=what+were+artistic+developments+in+the+20th+centuries PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vebapejun/igjsihs/video_game_release_date_warcraft.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://muzotom.22web.org/zorizapejimuwur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xinovupu/ghOhhjh/nonusifemuduwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382209/normal_5fd7995b3842f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rufebumu/hjOhbjh/25821607896.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4416151/normal_5ff977cf51fe7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4384468/normal_5fe4ef4039bfb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/giganopof/5iejbFM/weapon_mastery_new_world.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4425492/normal_5fd8084090824.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gurisolag.22web.org/73174873782.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fewukise/yVehbfj/xorefu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tazizaj.iblogger.org/code_128_font_for_excel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zejizoguzut/oLWBWhh/idle_defense_dark_forest_redeem_code.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xunijejozi/sxjfpoF/simcity_buildit_hack_2020_ios.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://jigufabusu.epizy.com/free_timeline_template_powerpoint.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wexiwifobezaxi.epizy.com/zakisev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bukulifuxevet.rf.gd/bazarodadexigafadono.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ef7f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF7F 5636 bytes
SHA-256: 16a9a32fd9bb5343f6ff3b289e446004ede678006fe8f4752eeb66ff9636f9db
font_01_sfnt_off0001029c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1029C 10672 bytes
SHA-256: d459c3d40003fe5497767ebba522bed0236cca87d3e861066e267e1edfcac917
font_02_sfnt_off000126dc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x126DC 4324 bytes
SHA-256: b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c

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