Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02e62eeb73ac0c0f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

68.3 KB Created: 2020-11-10 17:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 7abe6d890f58d5a0b421edb2d4eed932 SHA-1: a9c31dbfd581bcbb7236c828c6cc9dac13dbc6be SHA-256: 02e62eeb73ac0c0fa55cc203fbee23420a848cf991106eca3f75e8863a0cb4e5
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros. Heuristics indicate the use of Shell(), WScript.Shell, and CreateObject, along with a macro-enable lure. The VBA script attempts to execute mshta.exe with a VBScript payload, which is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The script's obfuscation and truncation prevent a more detailed analysis of the payload's exact behavior.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2874460245b766016bfef32818b699837da3534ded7c6ca2657a27e90151cdf7		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5377 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
e481e021a99f9bd32066e06e0d2c5fcad5b9c1ad94fbfbdadab3fce4491d13a5		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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