Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02dda69647ae8dab…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

32.1 KB First seen: 2023-04-12
MD5: a07c683a1ea5e4177300a6ad13a86953 SHA-1: 43fe211b559f79ec54ead2995dfd8e812eda1819 SHA-256: 02dda69647ae8dab1522ffcc0249eff3a32371b0394f563eee557162727c22f1
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by \objupdate, indicating an attempt to exploit a vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of the OLE object and the lure strongly suggests an exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000057d1.bin
23145b51e1a888b965f7d72677cd8041e82dc4ed6ac7628ed3a5ce890c1c8f09
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57D1 1487 bytes