Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02ce6b2eb2aa92b6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.9 KB
MD5: e9340879c3a81b3fdf1f530480e2696d SHA-1: 11faca7c9d281194269fb11a3dcf7e842873aee5 SHA-256: 02ce6b2eb2aa92b61570913970fd05126524a1bd9bbee4ac9316bf3fb8e08182
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF file that exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's LibTIFF component, to achieve code execution. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the PDF structure includes embedded content and XFA forms, typical of exploit delivery mechanisms. The exploit likely serves to download and execute a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream low PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
0c6c4d90d175e62c2addf29652a3d561b0eefee506444ba9d8599446352b73bf
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 81021 bytes