Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02c5b75826a2340a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

33.9 KB Created: 2020-11-03 08:30:15 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: 18d326e4af277007babd6cc4d7f0061a SHA-1: 4f30789d56f822cb0885b6a02e91f6c4e85b6afc SHA-256: 02c5b75826a2340a959f98d3e65c27da21818fb3c49ea0f60d12faa869c729b6
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, indicating a potential phishing or malware distribution attempt. Although no scripts were extracted, the presence of numerous external links and the ML classifier's high confidence score support the assessment of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/123?keyword=lurgio+middle+school+bedford+nh+school+hours In PDF document text
    • https://wikamarelifegef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134380256/7457719.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://podesasi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437149/683a4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ximazula.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738777/gopezijufod-leloliguverug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dixaxotobaba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134377978/6b403ddd3c0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xujaxivef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438557/a32b3aef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wajatajosow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134487766/3307866.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://waniremupamed.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407535/e958a834.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vakasuvarepem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134328097/nepelodow_pifunibedila_nufunogibabexev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zitavumerut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134465292/bowejup-naxosulofajej-pifemipekudiz-nowuzebijanu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1402/0507/files/50257907301.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c1c9a6d9-5262-457e-b49b-73cbed275a83/vapinufurudidebevodi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/0922/6398/files/download_app_apk_file.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0501/5837/1009/files/kemera.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8651/9195/files/jivifalilexozi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000467f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x467F 5308 bytes
SHA-256: 6476fc36fd12c118455b5f5927031df8ca46f10be698338d45fb049e255f4105
font_01_sfnt_off00005869.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5869 10088 bytes
SHA-256: 32d0198aab993e99211e44719ccfbb167ac40f79b281638594fb271de9da984b