Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02c0e51079348283…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.0 KB Created: 2020-10-06 11:49:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 4b9cf22659745263126561dc40e97dae SHA-1: 1312c5a1cb9e5656ff58c8af3312c58bc5f48ccd SHA-256: 02c0e51079348283aeca13ee3d5b4d7922ab1539f40609dc2536f81e76cfa5fd
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a significant number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable domains and a known malicious redirector. This suggests an attempt to manipulate search engine rankings or to lead users to malicious content. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of a malicious document, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=canal+caribe+tv+otuzco In PDF document text
    • http://zexozedi.dutchesstraveldiary.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454262/gaganukukus-sefugav-mutot-fuwafawofumu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.royaltyhrtdco.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130968943/sefemixunaviki-mesixedifos-zerepako-linonu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fexivolib.potofgreenflorist.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437728/zulede.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ganin.m-yes.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407921/nogedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pirez.soolahhoops.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637686/9643441.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://safub.rebeccaocainlaw.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738667/9dc63f154.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jamesarmstrongdesign.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775916/5d7d0dc62496bbd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mickkok.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408788/ditepikoburar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gizina.rossband.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384240/8225282.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0477/5519/8620/files/pudekuxan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5192/5155/files/nubadumogixezi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/3676/2527/files/un_nuevo_comienzo_en_ingles.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0486/4039/3384/files/windows_check_ports_usage.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0459/2471/2597/files/luragiki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0b853cc0-7fb1-497e-b004-b70cec31a058/64793000614.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/972a9c7e-1342-41cf-988f-1fe9dfa6f62a/nusumamakefof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8ef7bb5f-966b-4d01-84bd-6b4abd0ef720/44612790525.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b553225f-363a-4e10-a733-4a280bbfbcd3/11457574695.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006bee.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6BEE 4772 bytes
SHA-256: 88575f8a2a147a953f6194ca89e3c0c2ad91db08117c63913baac4c14c890c17
font_01_sfnt_off00007c41.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C41 10140 bytes
SHA-256: 10eedffeff22637366fd7c45a4317dee6765cb8122230f4790ae936cbf2a28f3

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