Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02bf8a09d55d543e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.24 MB
MD5: 211a0c66d553ec0d5df008998f28fd5c SHA-1: 98a4171d45dcad408ca28d630d3d051bb36a2b44 SHA-256: 02bf8a09d55d543e82bc70b2dff28c105230f7e25c98b12fb05eda01cea77b01
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor (Equation.3) which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED heuristics strongly indicates this exploit is present. The ".objupdate" directive further suggests an attempt to force OLE activation, leading to the execution of the embedded malicious content.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
e5a7d61c7bcd0b218cfa3983ac16deafdf5c7e2ab8804f296cc6ccb205f5c582		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27716 bytes
objdata_01_off0001d295.bin
05fc6d2b0a81484fefcb6cc6d4891013e53501190027c21cdd96bf0ea0957523		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D295 478713 bytes

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