Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02bf5fdb11eee6ed…

MALICIOUS

RTF

779.2 KB Created: 2018-01-10 21:16:00 First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 5228914b534a437eb7985702e78772be SHA-1: 83d7ceb2e55ae3d6bbf0936376e82fe5bc97a963 SHA-256: 02bf5fdb11eee6ede01cc061206fe98f60a6b5c90ffead31e8f0a87ccfa414ef
462 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically related to the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) and MSXML OLE activation (CVE-2017-8759). These heuristics strongly suggest the file is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The presence of an embedded OLE object and PE header further supports this, indicating a malicious payload is likely embedded or downloaded. The single extracted URL is likely related to the secondary payload delivery.

Heuristics 12

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-6564756-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Agent-6564756-0
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://doc.internetdocss.com/index In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003b89.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3B89 357634 bytes
SHA-256: 7d17c47e34db159ea08c6f48034f3422c239f5a989f30b32c6b11fa77b961af4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_SHELLEXEC, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: advapi32.dll, shell32.dll, ADVAPI32.DLL, RegOpenKeyExA, ShellExecuteA, GetProcAddress
objdata_01_off000b9234.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB9234 3627 bytes
SHA-256: da4c6ed0567628c85fec958ceb97aab189387ce47b65c5668b4a25c2da10e9d3
objdata_02_off000bb7cd.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB7CD 3627 bytes
SHA-256: 9542279b2408f99c65bb28c670e8c06335c92baaaa058e71e94524634c6ef0a4