Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02b3598292233edb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.1 KB Created: 2021-09-28 02:50:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: d945f9eae080c0b54e899eb31655c911 SHA-1: d4f1d7e14f2bd6098669f1cb862518f3dc96696f SHA-256: 02b3598292233edba07ed8ca8ae92cbc4a474aa18099224d3cb2384fae4a6654
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised WordPress sites or other disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or phish users. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware delivery via these links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://krisoc.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+do+group+call+on+android
    • http://moonlightmontessori.com/upload/files/78116721727.pdf
    • http://erainbowrealty.com/userfiles/file/99313983669.pdf
    • http://konditsionery-zheleznodorozhnyi.ru/upload_picture/file/genezifixelos.pdf
    • http://protech.com.ng/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16134679fb297c---24450385348.pdf
    • https://oncallanatomist.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fowiponusu.pdf
    • http://secohthailand.com/file_media/file_image/file/potugexubiw.pdf
    • https://mercedesmazo.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614adecf4413c---bofonefo.pdf
    • http://vbond.hk/editor_upload/file/19820583046.pdf
    • https://bahceneryaman.net/public/content-images/files/xower.pdf
    • https://picinterior.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dugevomiv.pdf
    • https://dp-silver.com/userfiles/file/damidobe.pdf
    • http://mueblesdepladur.es/1/userfiles/file/lukapazibugo.pdf
    • http://vers-ma.de/userfiles/file/6079945258.pdf
    • http://meditopthailand.com/file/54273192647.pdf
    • http://ophirtonhotel.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614389797abec---pizazojijoniseg.pdf
    • http://hemeringen.de/ckeditor_ablage/userfiles/files/61194131639.pdf
    • https://ijfbacknumber.com/editor_up/xetukivub.pdf
    • http://ymmicro.com/files/files/xeduz.pdf
    • https://cffcommunications.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1/16131b9894ed31---rurokudogonepotiwosose.pdf
    • http://www.davidwoodpersonnel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613c60bacbe1e---wazegatupo.pdf
    • https://medicabg.com/uploads/wysiwyg/files/pinewi.pdf
    • https://megatekspb.ru/sites/default/files/uploads/rawegufinigugud.pdf
    • http://xn--9i1b14lwsg1seumdzsx.com/upload/fckeditor/file/tunel.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b4d3.bin
4a0cc5e6bab5102b92e14f11d7ff76c999ebc9b282fffd8f563d9a158aec0a82
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB4D3 10568 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ccce.bin
66f30cf40c923105caf818882a5525a9a02af80b4646ff08e9e0215a52a61361
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCCCE 17212 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000f8c8.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF8C8 16792 bytes