Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Heuristics 11

• VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
  VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
• Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
  Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
• ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0
• ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
  ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
• AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
  AutoOpen macro
• CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
  CreateObject call
• GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
  GetObject call
• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
• VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
  Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
• Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
  Environ() call (env variable access)
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas

  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

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