Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 029922594c267d73…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

259.3 KB Created: 2020-12-29 16:15:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: b5a6ab7d6c6004f0fe30a4a2a9b9da5a SHA-1: 9b9b5ea164624a7cca83731b9dcfb4d1a0ca2470 SHA-256: 029922594c267d73669217c093a4c547d1f68ba99b16d149786dd26e1ce9c73c
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as an Ole10Native package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. This indicates the document is designed to deliver and execute a secondary malicious file upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
43443ad23cf00683da86be7986c58ebb0a6ac20e4f06f34c9f56275e2247e89b		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 251392 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
b03e72d5d4df19ac0fdc67a4084f2503ea85ffcd436a71b8b1626c86c2dcb14e		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 247041 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
21bfd589da185b93849993d2d1aba6b84d449b814051ee631bb23c29aed22fdb		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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