Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02952eafd80ea9f0…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: b7ffb5e6c70bab6ef43377e4b44d28fa SHA-1: 7e1ed77d967d495d2b5931d5b77261bb5cb1a807 SHA-256: 02952eafd80ea9f0bcc10bf9ba21df1bdf1214ad97d6428a1fa50e3f30324019
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a specific ProgID indicative of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000011e.bin
be08946041794ab50ef0950229d5bf5a4557ce2dd3a3cd6e71b60f749c9ac8aa
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E 1770 bytes