Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 028ce92960984f21…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

283.9 KB
MD5: b62e279e64a5da913489983b1e5dac3e SHA-1: 8ffc26de3ae478fa4f29c3e4ba7c79ac054a4a19 SHA-256: 028ce92960984f210c8e45e789bcbd0e7908cff32a44fdcb61cbd84e285adef1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a client-side vulnerability to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force OLE object activation, likely to trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000089.bin
9f9c7fda16835691089a8bc20e5f053ff26d8f37c792a7cc907ca08af9d8f8d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x89 93028 bytes