Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0269143862c3ff49…

MALICIOUS

PDF

98.1 KB Created: 2021-05-26 02:43:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-22
MD5: 3cbd956e917c14f77f943dadf860f4ad SHA-1: 2efccee4369195aef09f4868eea7fbf90f0ea88a SHA-256: 0269143862c3ff497c0cd4dff3843617451b950f3d310d14813653da3baf25ab
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting it is part of a link farm designed to drive traffic or host malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs point towards a tactic of redirecting users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gimoguvi.ru/strik?utm_term=lactic+acid+fermentation+chemical+reaction PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4458622/normal_604bb640b627d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vodexekuteb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776001/881126.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://papobujiwirila.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453114/mizemof_rowadumurab_lulekovu_gerotipifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xukobali.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134882082/kaluxukirad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412889/normal_6068cd0c6af1d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373240/normal_60528397eac9a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://muwubuzegutan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134649477/4d1c7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuvexege.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814851/sinuvijud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jenodaxadow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012655/lawija.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gojenejanoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739654/e751bd2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417046/normal_60492f9c8eb2a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4385880/normal_60209ea8b5613.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kibopomirisusi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741064/5956145.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4449172/normal_6004eef8a1d19.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://neninexi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134714879/7724739.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4462362/normal_606e67288884f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riwitasaroxaga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134656256/sebixevigi-fetaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xapijifas/wemalibatazusokukonew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gagagakigibapo/did_anyone_survive_the_aberfan_disaster.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zemunomipazikez/gevogazuwaka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000144e4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x144E4 5024 bytes
SHA-256: 9dda9e68cfb3138d8ef77c27cfde52d97ba770c5ef7bb0fcd5ac3767f8639df4
font_01_sfnt_off000155d4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x155D4 10992 bytes
SHA-256: 406e66a02ba21c6409fd3a8916909d125008edc4cc39cefdb47cb3b1b1c8f9c6