MALICIOUS
342
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate
The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open subroutine that uses VirtualProtect to allocate executable memory and SetTimer to execute shellcode. The shellcode is loaded from document properties, which are obfuscated using StrReverse. This indicates a downloader or loader functionality designed to execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.8a5a5aca5aca5a7a-OOXML-9981537-0' further supports this.
Heuristics 9
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VBA property-stored shellcode loader critical OLE_VBA_PROPERTY_SHELLCODE_LOADERVBA auto-exec macro takes the address (VarPtr) of a byte buffer decoded from a document property, marks memory executable (VirtualProtect/VirtualAlloc), and transfers control through a callback API (e.g. SetTimer/EnumWindows). The payload is hidden in the document properties rather than the macro source — the SVCReady loader pattern, a native shellcode runner rather than a parser CVE.
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ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.8a5a5aca5aca5a7a-OOXML-9981537-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.8a5a5aca5aca5a7a-OOXML-9981537-0
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OOXML part with non-standard content type and high-entropy data high OOXML_BOGUS_CUSTOM_PARTThe package declares a part with an invented content type (not an OpenXML/Office/standard media type) holding large, high-entropy (likely encrypted/packed) data. Legitimate OOXML files do not carry opaque binary blobs under custom content types; this is the embedded next-stage payload pattern used by loaders such as SVCReady.
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VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMEDThe VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
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Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
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GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJGetObject call
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VBA reads reversed config from document properties high OLE_VBA_REVERSED_DOCPROP_CONFIGVBA applies StrReverse to values read from the document's custom/built-in properties. Storing reversed configuration (URLs, CLSIDs, env-var names, payload names) in document properties keeps indicators out of the macro source — an obfuscation technique used by the SVCReady loader.
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VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: word/RcZcibiNFx.bin)
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.basba3c43af33904c931324be2321c85fe057c335667d37ad907ba796553c46ca9a |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 6608 bytes |
vbaProject_00.bin970225fc650cfee0f274ef95e3b36e57c2af2b5816856298f43fd8d38154e969 |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/RcZcibiNFx.bin | 15360 bytes |
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