Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02209684a5f0c380…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

75.6 KB Created: 2021-10-27 10:31:49 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: e05442fc9e4d9170df586aa5e6cbca63 SHA-1: ebf4e120c05e18c0f6090c14c77f5fe182594297 SHA-256: 02209684a5f0c380f39b372f87e5f98fc53b00fe9cbc23452de2c1f7b2334263
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains Excel 4.0 macros that reassemble a command to execute 'mshta C:\ProgramData\fjkdgjknfdgfjkdgjknfdg.rtf'. This command is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from one of the embedded URLs. The use of XLM macros and the execution method strongly suggest a downloader or initial access stage.

Heuristics 4

  • Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET
    Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks. The macro sheet is stored as XLSB/BIFF12 binary content, which many XML-only OOXML scanners miss.
  • XLM payload reassembled from CHAR()/split formulas critical OOXML_XLM_REASSEMBLED_PAYLOAD
    An Excel 4.0 macro sheet builds its payload inside the formula token stream by concatenating per-character CHAR() calls and string fragments, so no WinAPI name, shell command, or URL is ever contiguous in the .bin for a literal-bytes scan to find. Reassembling the formulas recovered download/execute API names, LOLBin commands (regsvr32/rundll32/mshta/wmic/powershell), or a payload URL — the de-obfuscated download-and-run kill chain.
  • URL reconstructed from XLM cell array (3 URLs) critical OOXML_XLM_CELL_ARRAY_URL
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet stages its payload URL across individual numeric cells (one ASCII charcode per cell) or inside an embedded HTA that uses VBScript Chr()/&-concat obfuscation. The reconstructed URL is invisible to literal-bytes URL extraction because it is never contiguous in the workbook stream. URLs were recovered by walking the BIFF12 record stream of every worksheet and macrosheet part and decoding RK/inline-string cells in both row-major and column-major order.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/910198718471503905/910490711214940200/fqpLGzgPapMnniggerjewfuck.mp4
    • https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/910203422790262788/910492087944896552/PnSRtfCniggerjewfuck.mp4
    • https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/910198718471503905/910490689081606224/VmiJyniggerjewfuck.mp4

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_sheet_00.bin
2812dcf0850c9c53d91a2986162e7d0c7bcbbe03d2c21a23f479f3efb64ef15d		 xlm-macrosheet OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin 3730 bytes

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