Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 021008f6219971c6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.1 KB Created: 2020-11-02 07:14:17 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 3f2610851629b55294e7e04e59fa4717 SHA-1: 932b3cd2559dd06a2c9e168545a67a86f8f5bc39 SHA-256: 021008f6219971c6bff82f7f7125fe8b2a8e4ca3a92fde68b14fb2b3cf38a8d8
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains an embedded URL that points to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of embedded URLs and the heuristic firings indicate an attempt to lure the user to a malicious site, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/aws?keyword=mr+ed+tv+show+cast
    • https://vujuzujotug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134478410/3917007.pdf
    • https://besavikeneg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815808/tefukumibo.pdf
    • https://wepugimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070973/292e4.pdf
    • https://wusoxebuwewete.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134432123/95bc8cf8.pdf
    • https://saxibodusazo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740440/2e2107d79.pdf
    • https://ditiwudo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452947/resovemunomoboj.pdf
    • https://tidemipevu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740592/bozolilote.pdf
    • https://vatedubajepe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134371970/zajovawolotened.pdf
    • https://wotufoxak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134308946/bivuwewijewitisi.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f22d3c21-ef0b-439b-ae36-2ab87c5f6bc9/13059305995.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lewuli/33086711697.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ribowexulo/mimadan.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3c9a8813-7254-4541-b872-24e9222d1e66/repakakubizezewupupepaven.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xisefowu/71051149570.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006f20.bin
8bb0bb2d779b34a8a34b56c51221a30f724b98c54eba1a15ba28cdc7f0a9e684		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F20 5152 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000080c4.bin
0aa063f7a71c0ae16b6212dac2d6303ee36e0269ea6685b9ed819e6bb4be768d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80C4 10136 bytes

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