Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 02024b737b34c3df…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: e4a7510883dc92fe24de85be76d864ea SHA-1: 05f81480a84d8f78c57441a5b7b9649f51628a5c SHA-256: 02024b737b34c3dfd2367c5e82a5fd9f625143f7491dac9c85686df49e7171f1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000c0.bin
eeabbd66313f137fb95dc0279d055c8f7b0bd3ebd4b855b5e0d38a18ed2a0c75
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC0 1801 bytes