Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0200c6524761fa0f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

451.1 KB Created: 2019-12-16 18:55:00 First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 39a1a0c7fbc0d4285888392a7c2880cb SHA-1: 68487eac9d27efc19d424403805b442378cdc25b SHA-256: 0200c6524761fa0f9412772a07e0bb127ea4d8ccf3af12a7c6f04c2de0780403
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability in MSXML. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution upon activation, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_OBJUPDATE, and the critical CVE_2017_8759 heuristic strongly indicate this exploitation vector.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body
    • http://bit.ly/2tU8hhsIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00054abf.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x54ABF 56089 bytes
SHA-256: 41d85cf9dceceea312b3937f08d3424d6f11d3e33ef1de78e5dad0c7a5f3f946