Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 01fda3068f24c2d6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

16.5 KB
MD5: 5b2030abc91c6a2b191832d6a1745fbe SHA-1: 55d93044ec67483c9e99a9f66abf64de7b48d45c SHA-256: 01fda3068f24c2d6beb21811c22e1ba5b433508da0b46295d14343484ee7f652
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data and specifically triggering heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates exploitation for client execution. The embedded OLE object data, when decoded, contains JavaScript, suggesting a potential secondary payload download or execution mechanism.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001421.bin
2392ca468035e0c748bef4e4d2ccd00e260fe50cc7b980ab4eb8bfbf15f71142
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1421 1589 bytes