Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 01df5bf796df9a28

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

426.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-24

MD5: fa5963bfe53cc7635beddea5cd9be8ee SHA-1: 7842f77ed7a105858718b150b8f19b4cb0c998a4 SHA-256: 01df5bf796df9a287858ff924675fae2510deb578f6a92a44116d7e3ec7f3eab

150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is loaded. The presence of the Ole10Native payload strongly indicates exploitation of this CVE. No VBA macros were found to be executable, suggesting the exploit is directly within the OLE object.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR

Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL

x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`ole10native_00.bin` `4b2d7092341f28969c15562fba7971aac42584fa519e580c6867a07594fbb76e`	ole-package	OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0164181C/ole10nATiVe	1454 bytes

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